- runner on first base only with less than 2 outs.
- runner on second base (but not third) with less than 2 outs.
- runner on third base (other bases my be occupied) with less than 2 outs.
Looking at the bottom row of the table below, we can see that the Tigers (as well as other Major League teams) almost never moved up from 1st to 2nd on balls hit in the air. The Tigers had 82 opportunities to go from 2nd to 3rd and made the advancement 46% of the time (compared to a league average of 29%). They had 57 opportunuties to go from 3rd to home and were successful 61% of the time (compared to a league average of 78%). So, for whatever reason, they were more successful relative to the league norm at advancing to 3rd than to home on balls caught by outfielders. Overall, they had 276 opportunities to advance on outfield outs and they made the advancement 27% of the time. This success rate was the same as league average.
Individually, the most successful Tigers in advancing on balls caught by outfielders were: Craig Monroe (36%), Ivan Rodriguez (36%), Brandon Inge (32%), and Carlos Guillen (32%). The trailers, in limted opportunities, were Marcus Thames (again) at 0% and Omar Infante at 18%.
In a future post, I'll look at stolen bases and other events not yet covered. Then, I'll combine all the base running information into one base running performance measure
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Table: Advancing on outfield flies - Tigers versus the average team
Player | Opp 1 | Adv | % | Opp 2 | Adv | % | Opp 3 | Adv | % | Opp | Adv | % |
| 8 | 0 | 0% | 9 | 4 | 44% | 5 | 4 | 80% | 22 | 8 | 36% |
Rodriguez | 13 | 1 | 8% | 8 | 5 | 63% | 4 | 3 | 75% | 25 | 9 | 36% |
Inge | 10 | 0 | 0% | 9 | 5 | 56% | 6 | 3 | 50% | 25 | 8 | 32% |
Guillen | 19 | 0 | 0% | 13 | 6 | 46% | 6 | 6 | 100% | 38 | 12 | 32% |
Polanco | 16 | 0 | 0% | 5 | 2 | 40% | 6 | 5 | 83% | 27 | 7 | 26% |
Granderson | 22 | 0 | 0% | 18 | 8 | 44% | 6 | 2 | 33% | 46 | 10 | 22% |
Ordonez | 17 | 1 | 6% | 4 | 2 | 50% | 7 | 3 | 43% | 28 | 6 | 21% |
| 8 | 0 | 0% | 2 | 0 | 0% | 6 | 3 | 50% | 16 | 3 | 19% |
Infante | 6 | 0 | 0% | 1 | 0 | 0% | 4 | 2 | 50% | 11 | 2 | 18% |
| 7 | 0 | 0% | 3 | 0 | 0% | 0 | 0 | 0% | 10 | 0 | 0% |
Team Totals | 137 | 2 | 1% | 82 | 38 | 46% | 57 | 35 | 61% | 276 | 75 | 27% |
MLB Averages | 141 | 2 | 1% | 96 | 28 | 29% | 65 | 51 | 78% | 301 | 81 | 27% |
Quick question, why are you not also tracking extra outs made in these baserunning endevors to gain a extra base? Should not the correct measurement actually be a combination of percentage attempted and percentage successful? If a baserunner has 20 opportunites to try and score from second on a single and he trys every time and is thrown out 5 times isn't he really a worse baserunner then one who only trys 10 times and is never thrown out?
ReplyDeleteYes, you are right. That's a good observation. In fact, making an out on the bases carries more weight than taking an extra base. Bill James estimates that an out on the bases is worth 3 advances on the bases. So, if someone makes 20 advances in 50 attempts but is thrown out on 1 of those attempts, the formula would be 20 - 3 = 17 out of 50.
ReplyDeleteI'm going to take the outs into consideration when I combine all the base running stuff into summary stats some time next week.