Jack Morris and pitching to the score

With the Hall of Fame voting just around the corner, I thought it would be a good time to revisit the Jack Morris debate. It usually goes something like this:

Jack Morris supporter: Morris had 254 lifetime victories and was the winningest pitcher of the 1980's. That should put him in the Hall of Fame.

Jack Morris skeptic: He won a lot of games because he was durable and played for great teams. Durabililty is a good thing but it doesn't make him a great pitcher. As for winning the most games in a decade, that's an arbitrary time period. It's no more meaningful that being the winningest pitcher from 1976 to 1985 or from 1985 to 1994. Morris just happened to have his peak years in a convenient period: 1980-1989.

Supporter: Jack was a big game pitcher. That 10 inning shutout in the 1991 World Series was a classic. He also won three post-season games for the Tigers 1984 championship team. He's the pitcher you want pitching the seventh game of a playoff for you.

Skeptic: But he pitched poorly during the 1987 and 1992 post-seasons.

Skeptic: Let's talk about his lifetime 3.90 ERA. He had a 105 ERA+ which means he was just 5% better than the league average pitcher during his career.

Supporter: His ERA was high because he pitched to the score. He would coast when his team had a big lead and save his best stuff for tight games. His ERA would have been a lot lower if he pitched the same way with a big lead as he did in close games.

The last part of that exchange is what the rest of this post is about. Morris has said on several occasions that he was more interested in getting wins and pitching deep into games than he was about his ERA and that he would give up a lot of his runs in games where his team had built up a big lead. I don't doubt that pitchers pitch differently according to the situation but how much does it affect their actual performance?

A few years ago, Joe Sheehan at Baseball Prospectus examined Morris' claim in "The Jack Morris Project". He tracked every inning of Morris' career and looked at his performance in different game situations - ties, one run leads, six run leads, etc. Joe did not find that Morris pitched much better in close games than he did with big leads. He did however, admit that he was not really sure what a pitcher's performance would look like if he actually did pitch to the score.

When I started examining the pitching to score theory in May, my goal was to expand upon Sheehan's project by looking at a large group of pitchers rather than just one. One limitation of my analysis at the time was that I had downloaded and prepared retrosheet data only from 1990 forward. Thus, I was comparing Jack Morris to more modern pitchers rather than his contemporaries. I now have data going back to 1977 so I can get a better idea of what pitching to the score looked like and which pitchers had such a tendency during Morris' era.

An example of how the analysis works is this: If a starting pitcher begins an inning with a two run lead, his runs allowed during that inning go into the "up by two runs" category. Using the retrosheet databases, I looked at every inning pitched by every starting pitcher between 1977 and 1994. The results are shown in Table 1 below.

Table 1: MLB ERA by Score - 1977-1994

	total	up 7+	up 6	up 5	up 4	up 3	up 2	up 1
IP	458,407	11,702	7,897	12,618	19,252	29,734	44,332	67,341
ERA	4.01	4.19	3.98	4.16	4.05	3.98	3.97	3.93

	tied	down 1	down 2	down 3	down 4	down 5+
IP	167,082	50,392	27,688	13,438	5,057	1,376
ERA	3.98	3.93	4.16	4.22	4.10	4.09

The table reveals that the overall ERA for starting pitchers was 4.01 and also that the lowest ERAs did indeed come in innings where the margin was small: 3.98 in tie games, 3.93 when up or down by one run, etc. In contrast, pitchers had worse ERAs in innings where they were behind by a significant margin: 4.10 when down by four, 4.09 when down by five or more, etc. That should be expected though because a pitcher who is behind by a lot of runs must not have been pitching well prior to the inning and would tend to continue to struggle going forward.

More interestingly, the ERAs in innings where pitchers had big leads were also relatively high: 4.05 with four run leads, 4.16 with five run leads, etc. The one exception was a 3.98 ERA with a six run lead but that appears to be just a blip in the data. The overall trend points to pitchers doing better in close games.

Table Two presents data comparing the performance of pitchers in close games (tied, down by one, up by one) and blow outs (leading by five or more runs). I computed a ratio as follows:

(ERA in close games/ERA in blow outs) X 100

A ratio of 100 would mean that pitchers performed the same in innings where the margin was small as in innings where they had big leads. A ratio under 100 would indicate that they did better when the score was close, whereas a ratio of over 100 would indicate a better ERA in innings beginning with a large lead.

Table 2: MLB ERA - Up by five runs versus within one run (1977-1994)

total ip	total ERA	IP up 5+ runs	ERA up 5+ runs	IP within 1 run	ERA within run	ratio
458,407	4.01	32,218	4.12	284,815	3.96	96

For the period 1997-1994, we get (3.96/4.12) x 100 = 96. That means that pitchers pitched 4% better in close games than in blow outs.

Next, I looked at individual pitchers and that's why I included so many years in the study. Just looking at one year or a couple years of data wasn't going to work because the sample size for innings pitching with a lead of five or more runs would be too small. So, for this part of the analysis, I selected 46 pitchers with 2,000 or more innings pitched during the period. These data are in Table 3 below.

Not all pitchers pitched better in close games. In fact, 21 0f the 46 pitched as well or better in blowouts. The ratios range from 59 (41% better in close situations) for Ron Darling to 140 (40% better in blow outs) for Jerry Reuss. This gives us some idea of what the performance of a pitcher who pitches to the score might look like - probably more like Darling than Reuss

Jack Morris had a ratio of 91 indicating that he was 9% better in close games than he was in games where he had a large lead. This is better than league average but not unusual - 12th out of 46 pitchers. What if Morris had pitched the same in blow outs as he did in close games? Well, he would have given up 12 fewer runs and finished with a career ERA of 3.87 rather than 3.90. That's hardly an earth shattering difference.

Table 3: Individual pitcher ERA - Up by five runs versus within one run

first	last	total ip	total ERA	IP up 5+ runs	ERA up 5+ runs	IP within 1 run	ERA within run	ratio
Ron	Darling	2,219	3.76	122	6.11	1,401	3.61	59
Bill	Gullickson	2,544	3.91	208	5.58	1,519	3.57	64
Mark	Langston	2,442	3.74	134	5.05	1,502	3.49	69
Frank	Viola	2,791	3.67	189	4.86	1,707	3.41	70
Tommy	John	2,300	3.71	176	4.90	1,350	3.51	72
Rick	Sutcliffe	2,565	4.10	203	5.13	1,466	4.00	78
Ron	Guidry	2,302	3.30	219	3.99	1,294	3.12	78
Rick	Rhoden	2,276	3.68	163	4.13	1,410	3.52	85
David	Stewart	2,238	3.85	144	4.44	1,299	3.87	87
Bob	Forsch	2,148	3.84	182	4.11	1,298	3.61	88
Mike	Krukow	2,164	3.90	138	4.25	1,386	3.84	90
Jack	Morris	3,746	3.90	320	4.11	2,178	3.76	91
Fernando	Valenzuela	2,417	3.42	149	3.50	1,510	3.19	91
Frank	Tanana	3,308	3.91	305	4.39	1,952	4.02	92
Dennis	Eckersley	2,121	3.81	160	4.16	1,277	3.86	93
Mike	Moore	2,687	4.25	161	4.59	1,639	4.27	93
Steve	Carlton	2,488	3.30	251	3.19	1,510	2.99	94
Bret	Saberhagen	2,004	3.20	143	3.41	1,239	3.23	95
Doyle	Alexander	2,493	3.88	177	3.91	1,577	3.73	96
Kevin	Gross	2,001	3.96	133	4.06	1,250	3.90	96
Dennis	Martinez	3,341	3.59	244	3.77	2,006	3.63	96
Tom	Seaver	2,062	3.37	162	3.49	1,252	3.38	97
Rick	Reuschel	2,417	3.28	167	3.35	1,535	3.31	99
Jimmy	Key	2,032	3.34	200	3.51	1,230	3.48	99
Don	Sutton	2,465	3.52	157	3.50	1,525	3.48	99
Joe	Niekro	2,269	3.51	206	3.53	1,381	3.56	101
Orel	Hershiser	2,089	2.99	159	2.89	1,288	2.92	101
Scott	Sanderson	2,380	3.84	171	3.78	1,452	3.86	102
Charlie	Hough	2,999	3.82	185	3.79	1,797	3.90	103
Roger	Clemens	2,391	2.94	203	2.88	1,368	2.97	103
Floyd	Bannister	2,298	4.04	143	4.09	1,416	4.24	104
Mike	Witt	2,021	3.89	189	3.62	1,196	3.84	106
Bob	Welch	3,013	3.45	173	3.17	1,918	3.38	107
Mike	Boddicker	2,041	3.81	172	3.41	1,198	3.64	107
Mike	Flanagan	2,537	3.89	197	3.65	1,608	3.96	108
Bob	Knepper	2,611	3.71	151	3.33	1,616	3.62	109
Jim	Clancy	2,373	4.19	167	4.00	1,473	4.37	109
Mike	Scott	2,026	3.53	119	3.09	1,342	3.43	111
Dwight	Gooden	2,163	3.10	187	2.69	1,328	3.01	112
Phil	Niekro	2,626	3.76	206	3.27	1,555	3.84	118
David	Stieb	2,809	3.42	191	3.02	1,746	3.56	118
Bruce	Hurst	2,371	3.83	228	3.20	1,459	3.79	118
Bert	Blyleven	3,055	3.63	268	3.02	1,778	3.73	123
Scott	McGregor	2,003	3.99	188	3.02	1,199	4.11	136
Nolan	Ryan	3,451	3.24	203	2.35	2,177	3.26	139
Jerry	Reuss	2,032	3.58	126	2.50	1,210	3.51	140

Now, let's try a different criteria for a big lead - up by 4 or more runs. The major league results for 1977-1994 are displayed in Table 4. Pitchers pitched 3 percent better in close games (3.96 ERA) than they did when they had a lead of four runs or more (4.10).

Table 4: MLB ERA - Up by four runs versus within one run

IP up 4+ runs	ERA up 4+ runs	IP within 1 run	ERA within run	ratio
51,469	4.10	284,815	3.96	97

Table 5 lists the individual pitchers and reveals that Jack Morris had a 3.92 ERA in games where he had a big lead. That yielded a ratio of 96 which was 23rd out of 46 pitchers. So, by this measure, Jack was right around league average in terms of pitching to the score.

Table 5: Individual pitcher ERA - Up by four runs versus within one run

first	last	total ip	total ERA	ip_up4_	era_up4_	IP within 1 run	ERA within run	ratio4
Ron	Darling	2,219	3.76	214	5.37	1,401	3.61	67
Bill	Gullickson	2,544	3.91	351	4.85	1,519	3.57	74
Tommy	John	2,300	3.71	278	4.76	1,350	3.51	74
Frank	Viola	2,791	3.67	329	4.30	1,707	3.41	79
Mark	Langston	2,442	3.74	236	4.35	1,502	3.49	80
Dennis	Martinez	3,341	3.59	389	4.47	2,006	3.63	81
Fernando	Valenzuela	2,417	3.42	253	3.88	1,510	3.19	82
Kevin	Gross	2,001	3.96	210	4.58	1,250	3.90	85
Bob	Forsch	2,148	3.84	277	4.20	1,298	3.61	86
Rick	Sutcliffe	2,565	4.10	343	4.61	1,466	4.00	87
Ron	Guidry	2,302	3.30	346	3.59	1,294	3.12	87
Mike	Krukow	2,164	3.90	224	4.38	1,386	3.84	88
David	Stewart	2,238	3.85	267	4.35	1,299	3.87	89
Mike	Scott	2,026	3.53	201	3.72	1,342	3.43	92
Rick	Rhoden	2,276	3.68	268	3.79	1,410	3.52	93
Rick	Reuschel	2,417	3.28	240	3.56	1,535	3.31	93
Dwight	Gooden	2,163	3.10	285	3.19	1,328	3.01	94
Scott	Sanderson	2,380	3.84	289	4.08	1,452	3.86	95
Mike	Moore	2,687	4.25	277	4.51	1,639	4.27	95
Bret	Saberhagen	2,004	3.20	235	3.41	1,239	3.23	95
Don	Sutton	2,465	3.52	290	3.66	1,525	3.48	95
Doyle	Alexander	2,493	3.88	297	3.91	1,577	3.73	95
Jack	Morris	3,746	3.90	507	3.92	2,178	3.76	96
Jim	Clancy	2,373	4.19	237	4.51	1,473	4.37	97
Bob	Knepper	2,611	3.71	279	3.68	1,616	3.62	98
Frank	Tanana	3,308	3.91	450	4.08	1,952	4.02	99
Joe	Niekro	2,269	3.51	289	3.58	1,381	3.56	99
Jimmy	Key	2,032	3.34	284	3.49	1,230	3.48	100
Steve	Carlton	2,488	3.30	374	2.98	1,510	2.99	100
Bruce	Hurst	2,371	3.83	306	3.71	1,459	3.79	102
Floyd	Bannister	2,298	4.04	244	4.13	1,416	4.24	103
Orel	Hershiser	2,089	2.99	229	2.83	1,288	2.92	103
Dennis	Eckersley	2,121	3.81	262	3.71	1,277	3.86	104
Mike	Witt	2,021	3.89	259	3.68	1,196	3.84	104
Scott	McGregor	2,003	3.99	298	3.93	1,199	4.11	105
Charlie	Hough	2,999	3.82	336	3.69	1,797	3.90	106
Roger	Clemens	2,391	2.94	358	2.79	1,368	2.97	107
Mike	Boddicker	2,041	3.81	277	3.42	1,198	3.64	107
Tom	Seaver	2,062	3.37	256	3.13	1,252	3.38	108
Phil	Niekro	2,626	3.76	298	3.54	1,555	3.84	109
Bob	Welch	3,013	3.45	299	3.04	1,918	3.38	111
Mike	Flanagan	2,537	3.89	318	3.54	1,608	3.96	112
Nolan	Ryan	3,451	3.24	329	2.65	2,177	3.26	123
Jerry	Reuss	2,032	3.58	234	2.81	1,210	3.51	125
Bert	Blyleven	3,055	3.63	402	2.98	1,778	3.73	125
David	Stieb	2,809	3.42	313	2.59	1,746	3.56	137

For those that need more convincing, I tried one more cutoff - 3 or more runs. Table 6 shows that major league pitchers had an ERA of 4.05 when up by three or more runs. That gave a ratio of 98. I have too many tables already so I won't add another big one but Morris had a 4.03 ERA in 798 innings where he had a lead of three runs or more. That comes out to a ratio of 96 which is 16th out of 46 pitchers.

If Morris had pitched the same way in those 798 innings as he did in close games, he would have allowed 23 fewer runs and had a career ERA of 3.85. Again, not a radical difference from 3.90.

Table 6: MLB ERA - Up by three runs versus within one run

IP up 3+ runs	ERA up 3+ runs	IP within 1 run	ERA within run	ratio
81,204	4.05	284,815	3.96	98

In conclusion, the typical pitcher did pitch better in close games than he did when he had a big lead. That is, pitchers did have a tendency to pitch to the score. There is some evidence that Jack Morris pitched to the score a little more than the typical pitcher but he was not extraordinary in that respect. He came nowhere close to pitchers like Ron Darling, Bill Gullickson and Tommy John who pitched at 25%-40% better with large leads than they did in close games. There is also no evidence that Morris would have had a significantly better career ERA had he not pitched to the score.

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